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Introduction 
Within each and every political decision is a particular process.  When 
deciding which side to come down on in a dispute, one organizes the facts, 
contemplates the issue at hand, and makes a decision.  How facts are organized, 
and more specifically, what they mean to an individual, is determined by their 
political ideology.  Ideologies, as Freeden states, “map the political and social 
worlds for us” and in turn, provide “competing interpretations of the facts” 
(Freeden, 6).  Ideology is derived from one’s upbringing, education, and family 
background.  Though it has been characterized by some as negative, it is not so 
much a phenomenon particular to certain political actors or certain disputes, but 
instead it is a fact of political life.  If we want to make sense of how people 
interact in political discussions, we must make sense of the presuppositions that 
govern those discussions.  Regardless of the organizational framework for 
deliberation, ideological leanings presuppose that process, and therefore are a 
driving force in the political world we live in.  As the United States becomes more 
diverse, the numerous political backgrounds that will define future debates will 
become more at odds with each other, making politics in the 21
st
 Century a battle 
over how facts will be interpreted, and by whom.  Our country has always been a 
nation of diversity, though it would be reasonable to assume that different sexual 
orientations, races, and ethnicities will have a larger stake in the political process 
in future years.  For the purposes of this paper, ideologies are beliefs, derived 
from our “whole life experience” (Rawls), which frame each political dispute that 
we enter into.  They present different interpretations of the facts at hand, and in 
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turn yield different sides to political arguments.  As long as we have free 
institutions, where a diversity of people and backgrounds define political 
discussion, ideologies will always be at the forefront in the deliberative forum.  
The purpose of this paper is to discuss, given the fact of ideological diversity, the 
path of the American democracy in the 21
st
 Century. 
 Some may argue that our constitution and its history should guide the 
precepts of democracy as our nation moves forward.  This line of thinking would 
tell us we should look to the text of the constitution, or to our founding fathers, to 
determine which values should embody our democratic principles.  However, the 
beauty of our constitution is that it has numerous meanings to different citizens in 
different contexts.  Our constitution had its own ideological derivation.  It was 
born in a time of revolution, where its founders where somewhat distrustful of the 
citizenry, and in turn was designed so the energy of the federal government would 
be able to control the momentary passions of mere citizens (Hamilton, 24).  
Furthermore, a large part of the vision for this new government was elitist, male, 
and Christian.   
Today, we live in a nation rich in diversity, where active citizens bring 
incredibly different backgrounds and presuppositions into the political forum.  
Many of the Federalists envisioned the Anglo-Saxon gentry of the colonies 
partaking in government, where today women, African-Americans, Hispanics, 
and homosexuals all partake in the business of governing the United States.  
Those different groups bring their different upbringings, life experiences, and 
political sympathies into the judicial and legislative processes.  And I will discuss 
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at length in this paper, their abilities to organize in the past have enabled their 
differential opinions to have a voice in mainstream politics.  Diverse groups will 
learn from this lesson in the modern era, and thus enable a diversity of interests to 
wield political power in the United States.  Therefore, given this increasing 
ideological diversity, the values that underlie political decisions in the future will 
be much more complicated then what our founding fathers envisioned.  
John Rawls attempted to build a framework in Political Liberalism where 
competing comprehensive visions can come to a consensus on fundamental 
political values in a free and democratic political society.  Rawls discusses some 
of the important problems that modern democracy faces given a significant 
plurality of comprehensive doctrines, although falls short on recognizing the 
importance of political ideology in discussing how fundamental values will be 
agreed upon.  Furthermore, his procedural method weakens his theory’s political 
viability because he makes significant assumptions regarding what is 
“reasonable” in the political forum.  These strict assumptions do allow any 
flexibility in building a political consensus, which severely limits Rawls’ ability 
to tackle the most pressing issues in a free and democratic deliberative forum.  
Thus, in constructing a theory of politics consistent with the fact of ideological 
diversity, my critique of Rawls’ theory will, in part, provide a guide of the major 
issues that my theory must tackle in order to claim political viability. 
Therefore, given what we know about the origins of our government and 
how they are significantly different from the political dynamic of the 21
st
 Century, 
I will argue that my theory of democracy should proceed by reinterpreting the 
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classical liberal principles that our nation was founded on with a premium on 
inclusion as dictated by the fact of ideological diversity.  Furthermore, the 
American democracy must value deliberation at the highest levels, making 
understanding of competing political notions easier, and adding to the value of 
diverse opinions.  A diversity of ideas will not be amalgamated into a 
representative political vision and policies based on that vision without 
deliberation.  This is apparent given the societal conditions of the 21
st
 Century and 
the characteristics of the American electorate.  It is equally important that 
democracy in the modern era be rooted in real politics, not considerations 
applicable to only academic circles.  On the most fundamental level, our 
democratic principles must be such so our political system is as inclusive as the 
fact of ideological diversity requires. 
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1.1 A Historical Analysis of Ideology 
Ideology is direct result of social and historical circumstances.  Individuals 
are driven to embrace particular modes of political thought for various reasons, 
but a widely accepted theory is that dominant trains of thought are a product of 
social upbringing and historical conditions.  Many scholars, within their studies of 
ideology, use their observations as a basis for proposing a framework by which 
individuals will view the world absent of the effects of ideology.  This, in my 
formulation, is not possible.  Ideology is a fact of political life, and furthermore, it 
is a fact of human existence.  In order to formulate a basis by which the ideology 
of current Americans necessitates a modern interpretation of the democratic 
principles underlying our constitution, a solid framework by which one can study 
ideology must be formed.  Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim both put forward 
theories of ideology that were deemed groundbreaking, claiming that ideology is 
socially constructed.  Furthermore, they provide examples of theorists who, 
despite the helpful observations they make concerning ideology and its social 
roots, make the mistake of dismissing its effects as purely negative.   
Marx and Engels: The Socio-Economic Derivation of Ideology 
Marxist theory builds a scientific framework that argues that the self 
destructive nature of the capitalist system will culminate in a movement by the 
working class to overthrow market centered economic institutions and replace 
them with a new economic paradigm that will enable social self determination.  
Marx explained the widespread acceptance of free market economic thinking with 
his theory of ideology.  He claimed that ideology was the implicit values 
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ingrained in capitalist economic institutions, which defended the supposed gains 
from free markets and covered up the exploitative and destructive aspects of the 
system (Schmitt).  Despite capitalism’s destructiveness, Marx claimed that 
ideology drove people to be disillusioned by their own exploitation.  As 
individuals are raised and live under the ideology of capitalism, they accept free 
markets as a fact of economic existence, and are unable to see its destructive 
nature.  Only when the exploitation and abuse of the working class becomes 
unbearable will there be a revolution that will overthrow capitalism and its 
dominant ideology.  Marx believed that once capitalism was replaced, ideology 
would cease to exist.  He did not put forward his ideas as a political theory, but 
instead a scientific analysis, ingrained within it fundamental truths concerning the 
nature of human behavior (historical materialism) and human productive 
capabilities. (Cocozza) 
Central to Marx’s argument is that ideology masks the truths apparent 
within the possibilities of social self determination.  The critics of Marxian 
ideology claim that these truths provide an ideological framework in itself, 
erasing any possibility that ideology would cease to exist under Marxism.  
Instead, another system with its own assumptions about human nature would 
become mainstreamed, and individuals brought up within that system would 
adopt different presuppositions about the logic and benefits under that economic 
paradigm.  Therefore, Marx’s view forms an ideology in itself, because it forms a 
lens by which one can analyze human relations, and presupposes certain 
judgments about economic relations (Freeden, 7). 
 9 
Marx, though far fetched in his prediction that ideology would cease to 
exist free of capitalism, provides important observations about the nature of 
ideology, its social derivation, and the role it plays within human existence.  First, 
he highlighted the large role that social and historical conditions play in molding 
our political thinking.  Explicit in his argument that capitalist institutions breed 
ideology is that social conditions legitimize those institutions.  A person’s social 
background will cause them to presuppose certain truths about the world, among 
them the nature of economic relations and the legitimacy of the system that 
governs them.  Second, Marx’s assertion that ideology can yield power is an 
everlasting product of political organization and its effect on ideology.  Today, 
our democracy is challenged with amalgamating multiple ideological 
considerations from numerous ethnic, religious, and socio-economic backgrounds.  
Ideology is power for those in control because it provides a framework for 
decision making and a political vision by which to follow (Freeden, 5).  However, 
unlike Marx’s opinion, ideology does not necessarily yield exploitative power. 
That depends solely on the beliefs being manifested and the manner by which 
they are carried out.  Marx’s view that ideology is always debilitating is a path 
that we wish not to take in 21
st
 Century America.  The existence of opposing sides 
to fundamental questions and visions of our country are an everlasting product of 
our pluralistic society.  We must create a democratic ideal within those 
parameters, not try to create a new ideological framework that we are required to 
follow. 
Mannheim’s “New Objectivity” 
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 Karl Mannheim led a new era of thinking concerning ideology and its 
effect on political life, which was heavily influenced by Marx’s earlier work on 
the subject.  He claimed that multiple ideologies arise within different social 
groups and historical periods, which Manheim built from the Marxist notion that 
ideology (generally speaking) is a product of socio-historical factors.  The rituals, 
traditions, and other cultural practices that derived these ideologies created a 
distorted view of the political world.  Starting with this hypothesis, Manheim 
went on to argue that an upper echelon of peoples needed to take on the task of 
interpreting human existence free from the disillusionment of ideology.  This, 
Manheim claimed, would create a “new objectivity” (Freeden, 14). 
 Manheim’s attempt to mark a path for an ‘objective’ body of knowledge, 
free from the untruths of ideology, parallels Marx’s claim that his study rose 
above the illusions of the ideological capitalist system.  He makes an important 
contribution in his hypothesis that different social conditions breed different 
ideologies, the result of which is a pluralistic society.  Nonetheless, his argument 
highlights the elitist repercussions of trying to rid the world of ideology and its 
effects.  Manheim states the fact that any attempt to remove an ideology 
necessarily implicates the birth of a new one – a problem that he struggles with in 
his writing.  We cannot take much from his “new objectivity” thesis, considering 
the conditions under which we live today.  Free, open, and democratic societies 
cannot breed an intelligent class of people to make policy and change the way 
mere ideological beings think.  The fact that Manheim had to resort to such a 
conclusion makes a powerful statement: within a free society, pluralism is a fact 
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of human political relationships, and must be accounted for in a theory of 
democracy.   
The Fact of Ideological Diversity 
 Although Manheim and Marx were not correct to dismiss ideology as a 
solely negative force in the political world, they did highlight important points 
about some of its effects.  Within any nation endowed with free institutions, 
different groups of people will necessarily associate themselves with various 
ideological views of the world.  Different contexts for bringing up children, 
whether it is different religious beliefs, geographic location, or ethnic and racial 
traditions, will breed different political interpretations as well as differing 
opinions on fundamental political values.   
 Manheim and Marx began a campaign to remove ideological 
considerations from the political forum.  They maintained that objectivity would 
emerge in human institutions absent of ideology, although ironically their own 
subjectivity dominated their arguments.  Implicit in their pleas for non-ideological 
political thinking was a distinct view that there were truths that normal individuals 
could not embrace while still under the influence of their own ideology.  These 
truths were apparent to Marx and Manheim because their own life experience 
brought them to believe they existed.  Similarly, average citizens have underlying 
beliefs based on their own life experience.  It is impossible to judge the epistemic 
value of these beliefs, and therefore it is important that the political forum allows 
the inclusion of all these points of view.  In a nation endowed with a diversity of 
people and opinions, it is necessary that the democratic principles that define that 
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country embrace that diversity, not shun other arguments as disillusioned or 
ideological.   
 What have we learned from the arguments of Marx and Manheim?  Most 
importantly, it is apparent that our own observations are a function of not only 
what we see or hear, but also how our own life experiences affect our 
interpretation of those facts.  Therefore, as the diversity of people who participate 
in politics increases, so will the number of prevalent political ideologies.  Since 
we have come to the conclusion that proposing a “new objectivity” is not possible 
without trying to impose a static view of the world on all people, we must work 
within the parameters given to us by the fact of ideological plurality.  This fact is 
a result of the diversity of social backgrounds of the people who make up the 
United States.  As the internet and other technological advancements make the 
distribution of information more efficient and widely available, the political 
process will become more inclusive.  Although this dynamic is contingent on the 
racist barriers to political advancement subsiding significantly, this process is well 
on its way to fruition, as I will discuss later on.   
Given this diversity of ideological interests, we must reinterpret the 
democratic principles that embody our constitution in order to make up for this 
diversity.  Our founding fathers did not envision such a diversity of interests 
involved in politics, and our constitutional framework was planned accordingly.   
1.2 The Ideological Origins of the Constitution 
In 1787, the leaders of the newly independent American states 
congregated in Philadelphia with the goal of amending the already standing 
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Articles of Confederation.  The Constitution that emerged from that convention 
continues to govern the United States and has shown tremendous structural 
continuity and applicability to modern political contexts.  Despite the structural 
cohesiveness of our constitutional democracy and the tenets that governed its 
conception, many of the precepts from which our founders drew up our 
Constitution are fundamentally inconsistent with the political conditions of the 
21
st
 Century.  Some aspects of that document, as argued by some revolutionary 
scholars, were geared towards limiting some citizen action in the political forum.  
Although embedded in the Constitution and the historical arguments supporting it 
do not directly prove this fact (Ketcham), many of the dynamics in colonial 
society lend credence to this argument (Wood).   
Within the context of this critical discussion of our Constitution, it is 
equally important to note that its principles are still applicable to modern times.  
Although we must depart from some its principles in order to make way for a 
democracy that is consistent with the fact of ideological diversity, we must fit our 
new democratic guidelines within the classical liberal guise of our founders.  It is 
not their philosophy that is necessarily at fault, but it is the application of that 
philosophy in the text of the Constitution and our governmental structure that can 
severely limit the participation of diverse groups of people in the American 
democracy.  Despite the fact that our government was founded on the principles 
of inclusion of multiple political interests (Federalist 10), the paralleling 
requirements for citizenship and inclusion in the business of government are 
problematic aspects of our founding that must be discussed in a modern context.  
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Therefore, the purpose of this section is to reconcile the lasting notions of good 
government within the political thought of our founding fathers with their 
fundamental inconsistent notion of political participation as necessitated by the 
fact of ideological diversity. 
Competing Visions of Equality: Tension in Colonial Society 
 The American Revolution was driven by a subconscious battle to 
overthrow the colonial conditions of paternalism, dependence, and patronage; in 
turn replacing them with an egalitarian society whose government was derived 
from the governed, not a centralized monarch and aristocracy (Wood).  Although 
there was agreement on the fundamental cause of discontent among the British 
colonists and the mode for freeing themselves through revolution, there were 
competing ideologies and political interests that drove the revolution and the 
subsequent debate at the Constitutional Convention.  According to our definition 
of ideology, it follows that these interests were largely a product of social 
conditions in colonial America.  This ideological tension among the colonists 
precipitated certain aspects of our Constitution that were born in light of this 
tension, which stands apart from the enlightened liberal philosophy that provides 
the undercurrents for the modern American democracy.  
 As a result of this tension, numerous social movements took hold in 
colonial society, leaving the writers of our Constitution with not only the task of 
providing a document timeless in its tenets but also strong enough to counteract 
the disunity and ideological strife evident in some aspects of colonial society.  In 
turn, the Constitution was drafted, in part, with these specific movements in mind 
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(Wood, 230), and therefore an argument can be made that some of the structural 
aspects of our government came as a result of 18
th
 Century political 
considerations.   
 At the time of the Constitutional Convention, there was a considerable 
movement by the colonists, derived from classical republican thought, to claim 
that citizens were all inherently equal, a condition that stood opposed to the 
patriarchal and aristocratic colonial society.  However, there were considerable 
differences on how to interpret this ideal, thus creating an ideological tension 
among many of our founders on the application of the classical notion of equality.  
Alexander Hamilton, who in Federalist No. 6 expressed his deep concern about 
the foundation for political action by average citizens, claimed that “it has been 
found…that momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active and 
imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of 
policy, utility or justice” (Hamilton, 24).  This formulation flies in the face of the 
ideal of disinteredness in the political forum, specifically that policy would be 
derived from a concern for the greater good, not special interests.  Therefore, 
many thinkers, such as Hamilton, embraced a form of abstract equality, as 
opposed to the more democratic absolute equality.  By abstract equality, I mean 
an equality of opportunity, whereas the more democratic (soon to be Anti-
Federalist) thinkers held on to the republican ideal that paternalism would be 
absent in a society where a “strong and numerous representation” (Brutus, IV) 
could ensure a more idealistic absolute equality.  These democratic tendencies 
were not born only from differences in the philosophic interpretation of 
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Enlightenment scholarship, but also from the more practiced fear of centralized 
rule following the Revolution.  Hamilton’s responded by expressing a different 
fear, that citizens would allow “momentary passions” (as was the case with mob 
rule) to control their political judgments.  
Based on these fears of mob rule, Hamilton and his fellow Federalists 
supported the formation of a republic that would place the energy of the federal 
government opposed to the tendency of citizens to allow their personal interests 
and momentary passions to cloud debate and possibly enable mob rule.  It is 
important to note that the energy of the Federal government, as supported by the 
Federalists, was not only a mechanism for limiting citizen power, it was also an 
avenue for enabling taxation as well as the creation of a national military.  
However, the tendency of thinkers such as Hamilton to write off the ability of 
citizens to engage in measured and rational deliberation in the political forum 
injected some undemocratic tendencies into our Constitution.  Among them was 
the inability of average citizens to have a direct say in the election of the Senate, 
the President, or the Judiciary.  In place of the numerous representation proposed 
by many Anti-Federalist thinkers was an elitist-minded Senate and Executive as 
well as strict regulations by which one could become a citizen, which limited who 
could vote in State and Congressional elections.  Today, there have been changes 
to this structure.  Nonetheless, the tendency of our founders to discount the 
intentions of citizen action in the political forum as a result of an ideological 
tension specific to 18
th
 Century politics severely limits the ability of the 
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Constitution to account for the ideological considerations in place in the modern 
era.    
Colonial Society’s Influence on the Federalists 
 In their writing, the Federalists (Hamilton, Madison, John Jay, etc.), held 
on to some of the old aspects ingrained in the British colonial society, specifically 
that those delegated power should meet certain requirements, most of which could 
only be fulfilled by the upper crust of American society.  As a result of these 
requirements, average citizens were expected to place an explicit trust in these 
leaders to make policy consistent with the public good and standards of good 
government.  Prior to the revolution, the colonies were run by people who 
identified with British aristocratic society, where those in power were given that 
right because of their family background and their relationships to the crown.  
However, “they knew that any society, however republican and however devoted 
to principles of equality, would still have to have some distinctions and gradations 
of rank arising from education and other…circumstances” (Wood, 233).  This 
idea was supported wholeheartedly by Thomas Jefferson, who explained quite 
explicitly in a letter to John Adams that a “natural aristocracy” exists, totally 
separate from the aristocracy defined by family background, which is instead 
dictated by leadership abilities, education, and more generally, “virtue and 
talents” (Koch and Peden, 579).  Although in theory these qualities can be held by 
any man, regardless of one’s family background (Ketcham), these distinctions 
were held during the early days of our republic for the most part only by those 
holding a distinguished last name.  To some scholars, these broad qualifications 
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for leadership have made it possible, as society progresses, to let differential 
voices participate in government (Ketcham).  However, even today, the 
expectations for political leadership still do not parallel characteristics that are 
realistically attainable for the greater number of persons in society.  A great 
majority of our Senators and former Presidents were educated in boarding 
schools, spent their college days at Ivy League colleges, and the expectation 
lingers among many Americans that these characteristics should be typical among 
our leaders.  At the turn of 19
th
 Century, the characteristics that political leaders 
were expected to have were only available to an elite segment of American 
society.  Therefore, although the idea of a “natural aristocracy” was meant to 
separate the new American society from its older British counterpart, this new 
aristocracy did not look much different from the one defined by the monarchical 
British government. 
 Furthering the notion that our founders did not envision an American 
polity lead by average citizens, there was also the effect of a social movement 
made up of artisans and other blue collar workers. They argued that their stake in 
the new government should parallel an absolute
1
 interpretation of the egalitarian 
ideal, which was currently supported by the democratic movement occurring in 
colonial society.  Regardless of the colonial gentry’s attachment to their own 
abstract egalitarianism, they did not want to share political power with carpenters, 
butchers, and shoemakers.  According to Gordon Wood, a renowned 
revolutionary scholar, it was not only their lack of education that made many of 
                                                 
1
 I am alluding to my explanation of the difference between “absolute” and “abstract” equality, 
which I describe on pg. 15.  
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the colonial leaders distrust artisans.  “It was their deep involvement…in work, 
trade, and business that made such…men unsuitable for high office” (247).  This 
requisite disinteredness was enabled by accumulating wealth to the point where 
one could be solely a public servant, and because of their savings did not have a 
significant economic interest ingrained in their political leadership.   
Nonetheless, these feelings were not displayed by all Federalist thinkers, 
specifically Alexander Hamilton.  Hamilton did believe that the United States 
would be a nation of commerce, and that our political interests would be 
amalgamated by all citizens’ likeminded desire to succeed economically.  
Furthermore, he claimed that America would become part of the international 
community through our pursuit of commerce and international trade.  Despite the 
disagreement among the upper echelon of colonial society on the role of 
economic interests in the political forum, there was fundamental agreement on a 
central point: a group of disinterested, well educated, white, Protestant, males 
were the ones most suited for governance, and that men such as the artisans who 
yearned for power and representation had to trust that these leaders would make 
policy with the public interest in mind.   
A Premium on Likeminded Citizens: More Contradictions with the Fact of 
Ideological Diversity 
In conjunction with the belief that citizens had to place significant trust in 
their leadership instead of having a direct stake in political decisions, numerous 
men at this time put a premium on like-mindedness, which they believed defined 
the strength and unity of the American polity.  If, in theory, most of the citizens in 
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the new United States shared some fundamental view of the political world and a 
common view of how to guide policy, then it would make sense that citizens 
could entrust power in a few chosen leaders, given that they shared many 
common beliefs. 
Thomas Jefferson, who was considered as one of the preeminent 
democratic thinkers of colonial America, stated unequivocally that the effect of 
numerous competing interests in the political forum, as a result of immigration 
policies that encouraged large scale emigrations from Europe, would be wholly 
disadvantageous to the unity of the new United States.  Today, we know that the 
United States is in fact a nation of immigrants, who together formed one country 
and a culture of pluralistic and competing political visions through large scale 
emigrations such as the ones that Jefferson wrote against.  He claimed: 
They will bring with them the principles of the government they leave, 
imbibed in their early youth; if able to throw them off, it will be in 
exchange for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as is usual, from one 
extreme to another.  It would be a miracle were they stop precisely at the 
point of temperate liberty…They will infuse into it their spirit, warp and 
bias its directions, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted  
mass (204). 
 
These persons, to Jefferson, would inject tyranny into the political forum not 
because of the specific nations that these emigrated from, but because 
“licentiousness” would arise as large groups of people would assimilate into a 
political culture they were not familiar with.  The values underlying the new 
republic, to Jefferson, were “more peculiar” than most other nations, and therefore 
were specific to the people currently inhabiting the United States.  Although 
Jefferson did not unequivocally reject immigration, the types of policies that he 
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wrote against are ironically the very types of policies that spurred the industrial 
revolution in the mid to late 19
th
 Century and in the end formed the America we 
know today.  Today’s republic, an amalgamation of numerous nationalities, 
religions, and political ideologies, is a direct result of the influx of numerous 
immigrants from Europe and other parts of the globe that has occurred throughout 
American history.  Unlike what Jefferson claimed, we know today that families 
did not come to the United States in droves to impose their own politics. They 
made the long, illness-filled, uncomfortable journey to America because they 
wanted to share in a political tradition that did not discriminate in matters of 
religion, nor force them to embrace the policies of a monarch. 
 Jefferson is another clear example of a founding father who had idealistic 
visions of an egalitarian American society, yet did not transfer that philosophy 
into a pragmatic and useful form.  He instead let the paternalistic and dependency-
laden culture of 18
th
 Century Great Britain be reflected in his ideas, so that his 
Enlightenment ideas and egalitarian philosophy were transformed into an elitist 
brand of British Republicanism.  John Jay parallels Jefferson in Federalist No. 2, 
when he states that “Providence” has blessed the new United States with “people 
descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the 
same religion…[and] very similar in their manners and customs” (6).  He goes on 
to claim that the strength of the new polity will depend on these shared 
characteristics, which is an idea, like Jefferson’s, that is not consistent with a 
political vision dictated by an inclusion of many different ideological interests.  
Instead, it is a blanket denial that such a diversity is tantamount to a strong 
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democracy and flies in the face of the inclusionary and egalitarian-minded 
political philosophy on which our nation was founded.   
Fundamental Inconsistencies 
 The tendency of our founding fathers to move away from democratic 
principles in light of their fear of numerous and diverse political interests shows 
some of the significant differences in the democratic principles underlying the 
writing of the Constitution and the principles that should be embraced today given 
the fact of ideological diversity.  However, it is important to note that the 
intellectual inconsistencies in the political thinking of our founders do not justify 
a blanket dismissal of the applicability of early American political values to 
today’s political world.  On the other hand, it shows that we must build from the 
republican principles of yesterday with the diversity of ideological interests that 
define the building blocks of today.  Nonetheless, the undemocratic tendencies of 
some parts of our Constitution should be reinterpreted given the fact of 
ideological diversity, which will dominate American politics for the foreseeable 
future.   
1.3 The Fact of Ideological Diversity: Elaborated and Further Defined 
 Unlike what Jefferson and our other founding fathers envisioned, the 
United States today is defined by diverse cultures yet singular in its goal to live in 
a wholly democratic political domain.  As stated in my discussion on ideology, 
the diverse backgrounds of Americans yield a parallel diversity of political 
ideologies.  These differing lenses by which individuals view the political world 
transfer into various political interests, all of which should have an equal say in 
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the American democracy.  To claim that our democracy should be derived from 
the notion of a diversity of ideological interests based solely on a definition of 
ideology is not sufficient.  In this section, I wish to bring forth evidence that 
today’s political issues are becoming more representative of a diverse population, 
and that leaders from all sides of the political spectrum are recognizing the 
importance of having inclusion at the forefront of new policy.  Inclusion is not yet 
a fact of American political life, there are incredible strides left to take. 
Nonetheless, diverse ideological interests are injecting themselves into 
contemporary political debate and policy considerations.  Thus, it should be clear 
that our democratic principles should enable representation that gives differing 
ideologies an equal voice. 
Political Organization: Breeding Ground for Diverse Ideologies 
 Ideology, albeit a vague proxy to measure political behavior (Minar, 320), 
manifests itself in the political forum under the guise of organizations (Barnes).  
Specifically, the “linkage” between political thought and behavior is facilitated 
through political organizations (Barnes, 513), which also are the main avenue for 
diverse ideologies to make their influence known in contemporary American 
politics.  Under the ideological continuity of political organization, diverse 
ideologies can find help in intervening in the greater political debates (Barnes, 
529), and in turn provide differential opinions to policy questions in the 
deliberative forum.  Today, minority groups use organization as a mode for 
streamlining their message and picking the right battles to fight, which gives their 
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political cause a greater chance of being heard (Barnes) and having real influence 
in policy and legal debates.   
An excellent example of this phenomenon is exhibited by the NAACP, 
which since the early 20
th
 Century has laid the ideological groundwork for freeing 
black Americans from what our current President has called the “central defect of 
our founding.”  President Bush may have been referring to comments such as 
Thomas Jefferson’s, who in 1782 stated that blacks “are inferior to the whites in 
the endowments both of body and mind” (243).  From this backdrop, the NAACP 
and similar organizations have fought to rid our nation of the ideological burden 
bestowed on us by our founders, and in turn provide America with political and 
legal perspectives derived from a group who has been discriminated against 
throughout American history.  It led the fight in the 60’s to ban segregation, and 
won a major battle with the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, which was 
followed by the Voting Rights Act in 1965.  Both of these legislative acts were 
preceded by the 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 
which was argued before the court by special counsel of the NAACP, Thurgood 
Marshal, who became the first black Supreme Court justice in 1967.   
The continuity of the message put forward by the NAACP has helped it 
drastically throughout its history, and in turn lends credence to the argument that 
consistent ideologies bred through organization are the “intervening variable” in 
political debate (Dahrendorf, qtd. in Barnes, 521).  Thus, the ability of 
organizations such as the NAACP to keep its message consistent can have 
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considerable consequences, a dynamic that is enabled by having a just cause and a 
sound organizational structure.   
In terms of the larger structure of this paper, the effect of the NAACP and 
similar organizations looms large in contemporary U.S. politics.  The ideological 
message spread by the NAACP has had substantive legal and policy 
ramifications, with more sure to come in the future.  With every passing election, 
there is a greater black contingency in Congress and in state governments.  
Furthermore, organizations in Congress, such as the Congressional Black Caucus, 
continue to advance the African American cause in the halls of the Capital.  The 
voice of black Americans is no longer completely muffled by the evil of racism in 
American politics, a product of using political organization to drive home the 
tenets of their differential point of view.   
Gay Rights in Contemporary American Politics and Pop Culture 
 As discussed earlier, the founding of our government and its fundamental 
political values was accompanied by an implicit secularization of Christian 
principles in our Constitution.  The current debate over homosexual marriage and 
broader measures of gay rights can be described as “one of the most divisive 
issues in American society” (Waxman, 2).  Moreover, the rhetoric by political 
leaders and others claiming that a ban on gay marriage would protect the 
“sanctity” of marriage has an overly ecclesiastical tone, due to marriage being 
originally a religious institution.  In the United States today, local governments 
have jurisdiction over marriage, and therefore local debates over the 
Constitutionality, or more broadly, the general merit of, gay marriage have 
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become quite common in some parts of America.  As opposed to the movement 
by African Americans mentioned in the preceding section, the gay rights 
movement is still in its beginning stages, and the rights of differential sexualities 
are slowly becoming part of the conscience of left-leaning politicians.   This is 
largely different from the status of the rights of African Americans, whose rights 
are championed by persons across the political spectrum, with differences 
between left and right being based on the application of those rights, not whether 
the rights exist in principle.  Gay rights, on the other hand, are not yet recognized 
by all Americans as deserving protection from federal or local governments.  This 
could be attributed, in part, to the fact that gays do not make up a major political 
constituency, therefore do not yet command the respect that other minority 
communities do from politicians.  Nonetheless, the gay rights movement is in the 
early stages of development and thus lacking a central voice that carried the 
NAACP over the hump in the 60’s.  For our purposes, the fact that this issue is 
currently spreading into pop culture and continues to be a divisive issue in current 
American politics shows the beginning stages of a diverse ideology making its 
way into the mainstream political forum. 
 Currently, in Topeka, Kansas, there has been a heated battle over gay 
rights, which has overtaken the political forum of this small Midwestern 
community.  Tiffany Muller, the first openly gay officeholder in Topeka, has been 
challenged to a primary for election to the city council by Jael Phelps, the 
granddaughter of famous anti-gay activist Rev. Fred Phelps Sr.  Accompanying 
this vote is a referendum on whether to ban legislation protecting gay rights for 
 27 
ten years, which would effectively overturn recent legislation sponsored by Ms. 
Muller that bans discrimination against gays in hiring.  With 13 states last year 
amending their constitutions to ban gay marriage, and the powerful Evangelical 
Christian lobby campaigning against gay rights in general, the debate in Topeka is 
typical of many others across the country.   
In the case of Topeka, it is important to note the overly religious tone of 
Jael Phelps and her supporters in their criticism of Ms. Muller and other members 
of the gay rights movement.  Ms. Phelps, when commenting on the “respect” 
given to her based on her relation to her grandfather, claimed that “it’s a sign I’m 
doing the right thing, serving the Lord.”  This parallels her grandfather’s (Rev. 
Phelps) remarks concerning his campaign against Ms. Muller and other gays: 
“That’s my job – to preach this stuff and to strive against sin.”  Besides Rev. 
Phelps, Evangelical Christian groups make up most of the lobby against gay 
rights in Topeka; and although they try to separate themselves from “hate 
mongers” (ie: Phelps), their position in this debate is based on entirely religious 
principles.  Recently, when tapes surfaced detailing President Bush’s feelings on 
gay rights preceding his 2000 campaign, he described gays as “sinners,” who he 
could not discriminate against considering he, like all human beings, was a 
“sinner” as well.   
Despite the Christian principles at the center of the lobby against gay 
rights, some Christians in Topeka are taking the side of Ms. Muller in this debate 
because of what they perceive as hate implicit in Ms. Phelps’ candidacy.  The 
New York Times reported at the time of the Topeka election that a significant 
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constituency of conservative businessmen and Christian ministers are siding 
against Ms. Phelps and the ban on gay rights legislation.  Even though it required 
them to see the drastic and insensitive tactics employed by Rev. Phelps (for 
example, he has been known to picket outside of the funerals of notable Topekans 
who have championed gay rights), this shows the ability of the religious right to 
recognize the civic value inherent in principles such as inclusion and diversity, 
which can be embraced regardless of one’s religious affiliation.    
On March 2, 2005, it was reported that Ms. Phelps’ bid to unseat Tiffany 
Muller was a failure, as was the referendum suspending gay rights legislation in 
Topeka.  It is apparent that the gay rights movement, in its fight to ensure 
representation and to protect against discrimination, is in conflict with the overtly 
Christian principles that continue to dominate the American social conscience.   
Little by little, as fights like the above election in Topeka are won, the gay rights 
movement will find its place in the American polity.   
Despite this battle, one should not overlook the fact that an issue that at 
one time was limited to the fringe of American politics is now at the forefront of 
not only political debate, but pop culture as well.  In Februrary 2005, the Fox 
show “The Simpsons” broadcast a new episode discussing the issue of gay 
marriage in a satirical setting entitled “There’s Something About Marrying.”  In 
the episode, the town of Springfield, where the show is set, enacts legislation 
allowing gays to marry in order to enhance revenue from its tourism industry.   
One of the show’s main characters, Homer Simpson, received a license to marry 
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over the internet, and conducts dozens of marriages, including one to his wife’s 
sister, who ‘comes out of the closet’ during the episode.   
Accompanying the satirical theme songs, funny one-liners, and 
“lampooning” (Stanley, 2) of gay and lesbian stereotypes, there are clear 
messages regarding American pop culture and its place in recognizing the 
importance of hot-button political debates.  According to Professor Mark Kaplan, 
a professor of communications at the University of Southern California, the 
writers of “The Simpsons” are telling us that “these people (homosexuals) are 
your neighbors in the Springfield that is America” (qtd. in Waxman, 2), and 
therefore should not have their lifestyles shunned away as if it is foreign to 
average Americans.  It is known that “The Simpsons” is “no stranger to hot button 
social, religious, and political issues” (Waxman, 2).  Yet the interesting point 
about this particular issue is that gay rights have become so central an issue in 
American politics that it can be poked fun at by one of the most recognizable 
shows in American television.  Although its inclusion in this medium says 
volumes about the strides made by gay rights pioneers such as Tiffany Muller, 
Christian groups continue to bash television shows that may give an approving 
stance on issues of gay rights (Stanley).  Brent Bozel III, the President of the 
Parents Television Council, a Conservative lobbying group, claimed that “at a 
time when the public mood is overwhelmingly against gay marriage, any show 
that promotes gay marriage is deliberately bucking the public mood” (qtd. in 
Waxman, 2).  Obviously, the fact that “The Simpsons” was able to embrace this 
topic in this manner shows that the “public mood,” as measured by Mr. Bozel, is 
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not as representative of broader American society as he might think.  Mr. Bozel’s 
statement also says something fundamental about the American political forum.  
The fact that an individual whose business is lobbying, thus being an active player 
in the deliberative forum, can make such a blanket statement regarding this issue, 
shows that our democracy does not recognize these divisive issues regarding 
diverse ideologies in a manner that wholly includes them into mainstream 
political debate.  There continues to be a part of American politics that will 
always claim that issues such as these are on the fringe, thus making the 
movement to extend such rights to gays or other groups immaterial to the broader 
American political society.  Thus, although this “The Simpsons” episode exhibits 
the central place the fight for gay rights has in American culture, the lack of 
respect given to these opinions by many members of the American polity proves 
the necessity for a framework by which people holding these views will always be 
recognized as deserving a place in mainstream politics. 
Ideological Plurality in American Politics 
As we move into the future, injecting diverse ideologies into the political 
forum will become the norm, and the legislation effected will not be revolutionary 
or momentous, but a standard component of U.S. policy making.  Therefore, the 
way we look at our polity must take this into account.  Democratically, putting a 
premium on inclusiveness is not left-wing or radical, but instead an enduring 
reality of modern America.  The civil rights movement is a perfect example of 
how a diverse ideology found acceptance in mainstream American politics.  Its 
leaders fought vigorously against the racist tendencies of American culture 
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handed down from previous generations.  As the gay rights movement spurs 
debate locally and nationally, and moves to map a common agenda (Wash. Post), 
the liberties of persons with alternative sexualities will be increasingly recognized 
in mainstream politics.  
Although we know that through a long and enduring battle for political 
recognition, diverse ideological interests can become recognized as having an 
important voice in America, this is not enough.  Within that battle is a greater war, 
a war against the exclusionary presuppositions in our democracy.  Americans, 
along with being tolerant and freedom-loving people, are resistant to change, and 
constantly appeal to tradition.  These tendencies form a formidable barrier for 
groups such as African Americans and gays to find a place in our polity without 
enduring this long battle.   
The fact of ideological diversity, which tells us that our nation will be 
made up of a plurality of ideological interests as a product of the diverse societal 
contexts within America, will be an enduring aspect of our political culture 
throughout the 21
st
 Century.  Because of this fact, and keeping constant the 
overarching liberal principles that our nation was founded on, the theoretical basis 
for American democracy must be reinterpreted in order to facilitate future 
inclusion.  Therefore, the goal of this theory of democracy is to ensure that the 
long, tireless battle endured by African Americans and others is made easier for 
future diverse political interests through a purely inclusive political domain 
supported by strong democratic principles.   
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2.1 Political Liberalism  
Central to the task of creating a theoretical framework for American 
democracy in the 21
st
 Century is a discussion of the work of prior theorists who 
have undertaken similar projects.  Thus, we must analyze, with a critical eye, the 
work of John Rawls and his procedural theory of political liberalism.  Rawls 
sought to create a “political conception of justice” by specifying a political 
framework where a plural and democratic society can embrace the fundamental 
principles necessary to a stable political domain, yet do this in a way that is 
separate from comprehensive religious or philosophical values.  For the purposes 
of this paper, the object of this discussion is to analyze Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism in light of the fact of ideological diversity, which was outlined and 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
 Although their objects are similar, Rawls’ project is fundamentally 
different from the goal of this paper in its configuration, which I will argue 
provides much of the basis for criticism.  Rawls uses a structuralist approach in 
constructing his theory, which separates the differing interests within a political 
society using broad assumptions about the actors who espouse those interests.  
This approach, in a theoretical sense, creates a more stable political framework 
because the strict assumptions that govern individuals in the political forum limit 
their behavior and presuppose only certain types of debate.  Stability “for the right 
reasons” was a central goal of Rawls’ “political conception of justice” and 
subsequently creates a political theory centered on procedure.  Procedures, in a 
broad sense, do not account for the intricacies of political decision making and the 
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effect ideology has on those decisions.  As I will argue, Rawls’ procedural 
approach abandons both the most pressing questions that arise in a political 
society as well as describing the profound effect ideology has on the deliberative 
process.  Furthermore, the broad assumptions that govern these procedures are not 
congruent to real political conditions, which limits the extent Rawls’ theory can 
describe and help reconcile real political problems. 
The Overlapping Consensus 
In his first groundbreaking work, Theory of Justice, Rawls provides a non-
metaphysical framework, which allows a society, using an imaginary “veil of 
ignorance,” to choose political ideals absent of any personal gain that may come 
from embracing particular ideals.  This condition, called the “original position,” 
enabled a process of choice, not negotiation, because the veil of ignorance 
effectively removes the plurality of political interests ingrained in any free society 
(D’Agostino).  Rawls realized the weakness of Theory in creating a truly political 
conception, and sought out to create such a conception in Political Liberalism.  
The goal of Political Liberalism, as opposed to creating a framework for social 
justice, was to create a “political conception of justice” based on the fact that a 
plurality of comprehensive doctrines will participate in a political forum defined 
by free and democratic institutions.  According to Rawls, “comprehensive 
doctrines” are religious beliefs, comprehensive philosophies, or in broad terms 
any doctrine that can be applied to all facets of an individual’s life because of a 
moral attachment to its tenets.   
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Given a political forum rich in differing comprehensive doctrines, Rawls 
postulated that through an “overlapping consensus” persons in a free and 
democratic society can embrace political principles separate from their 
philosophic or religious beliefs.  Similar to the original position, the “overlapping 
consensus” is not a process of negotiation, but differing from the original position, 
it is a process of deliberative choice.  It is deliberative in the sense that rational 
actors in the political domain will debate fundamental political values, the result 
of that debate being a collective choice on values that can be embraced by all 
comprehensive doctrines for solely political reasons.  Thus, Rawls envisions a 
deliberative forum where a plurality of individuals can discuss and come to a 
consensus on political values, which though may be consistent with their 
comprehensive views, are decided in that forum for solely political reasons. 
The easiest and most effective way to explain the dynamic of an 
“overlapping consensus” is through a venn diagram, which I have provided 
below:  
 
As displayed by figure A above, a given political domain that specifies 
certain fundamental political values; comprehensive doctrines will be able to 
“Domain of the Political” – defined by explicit political 
values, which “justice as fairness requires” 
Religion 1 – 
Embraces Pol. 
Values A, B, C 
Religion 2 – 
Embraces 
Political Values 
B, C, D 
        Figure A 
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embrace these values in a particular way that is consistent with their 
comprehensive views.  In this instance, the religious domain, which these 
doctrines may or may not overlap in, is not part of the political.  Therefore, 
although this consensus may be consistent with their comprehensive or religious 
views, it is not directly derived from them.  Differing comprehensive doctrines 
agree on the underlying political values in a society, which make up the “political 
conception of justice.”  As stated by the requirements of “justice as fairness,” 
these are ingrained political ideals that can override other ideals or values in a 
deliberative process.  Because these ideals are specified in such a way, Religion 1 
and 2 are able to overlap on principles B and C.  Embracing these principles, 
albeit from one’s own comprehensive point of view, enables an overlapping 
consensus on B and C. 
Now, let me elaborate on the reasons why Rawls maintains that the 
overlapping consensus must be made based on political reasons, not values 
extracted from a religious point of view.  According to Rawls, if differing 
comprehensive doctrines agreed on the foundation for political institutions based 
on religious reasons, then it may be assumed that debate within those institutions 
could become an argument over those religious or moral values that underlie the 
legitimacy of that political forum.  If one sees a political institution as being 
embodied by, and acceptable because of, religious ideals, then it would follow, 
under Rawls’ framework, that persons who enjoy membership to that institution 
would make political decisions based on those ideals.  However, if institutions are 
agreed upon based on political values, not religious ones, then the political forum 
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will be totally separate, in a political sense, from the religious or moral beliefs that 
define one’s comprehensive doctrine.  Therefore, Rawls claims that moral or 
religious values cannot underlie democratic institutions and still yield stability 
(Justice as Fairness, 225).  However, as I will discuss later, when debating 
pressing issues within a political society, religious or moral values may still be a 
point of debate even if those values are not what defines the political institutions 
in that society. 
Rawls specifies that this consensus is not a modus vivendi, which is an 
agreement derived from negotiation and based on the reciprocal need for balance 
of power (Liberalism, 147-8).  He departs from these types of agreements because 
of their lack of stability, and the absence of any moral attachment to the product 
of negotiation.  Rawls claims that a modus vivendi, though the product of a 
political process, creates a wholly unstable equilibrium that does not satisfy his 
test for being stable “for the right reasons.”  “The right reasons” are political 
reasons, supported by moral attachment to their tenets, through which an 
overlapping consensus can take place.  In his discussion on these topics, Rawls 
cites the “Wars of Religion” following the Reformation, where power sharing 
agreements among different Christian groups fostered momentary peace, yet no 
lasting stability because a change in the balance of power between those groups in 
effect eliminated the modus vivendi between them.  Fearing such instability in his 
political domain, Rawls proposed to search for an overlapping consensus in order 
to provide a moral, yet wholly political agreement on political values that can 
provide the basis for the democratic institutions that govern a free society.   
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Despite the stability created through an overlapping consensus, the lack of 
room in Rawls’ theory for compromise is a prime example of his strict 
assumptions removing his theoretical framework from the real political world.  In 
many instances, compromise, even if it based on an unstable balance of power, is 
both a common and necessary part of any democratic framework.  Under a system 
where a diversity of political interests plays an active role in the political forum, 
the only path to agreement on some issues may be under some form of 
compromise.  Furthermore, compromise in the deliberative forum is tantamount to 
the business of government because it can prevent the gridlock that comes as a 
result of strong partisan or ideological interests on opposing sides to some 
debates.  Especially when applying what we know about political ideology, which 
tells us that people from differing backgrounds will view debates through 
different ideological lenses, it is even more obvious that compromise may be the 
only way to facilitate agreement in a society dominated by the fact of ideological 
diversity.   
 According to Rawls, a modus vivendi is solely a power sharing agreement, 
not a morally based consensus derived from fundamental political values.  Yet 
despite its structural shortcoming and lack of stability, agreements of this type, 
regardless of how you may define them, will be a lasting component of any 
democratic process.  The balance of power within a democracy is never static, but 
instead is a dynamic equilibrium, supported by various political interests and 
ideologies.  Although an overlapping consensus, as Rawls describes it, is 
undoubtedly stable, it is not grounded on real political conditions.  Therefore, 
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concurrent to his creation of a stable equilibrium, which Rawls claims is 
necessary to his “political conception of justice,” he departs from the political 
world because a truly political domain does not embody characteristics that allow 
one to presuppose that actors in a free and open deliberative forum will keep 
values that are so central to their personal lives absent from their political actions. 
“Precepts for Reasonable Discussion” and the Dynamics of the Overlapping 
Consensus 
 When defining the way deliberation should work within his “domain of 
the political,” Rawls specifies certain “precepts” by which reasonable persons 
should act within the political forum.  The most important “precept for reasonable 
discussion,” for our purposes, is described in the following passage: 
Second, when we are reasonable we are prepared to find substantive and 
even intractable disagreements on basic questions.  The first general fact 
(that governs the political domain) means that the basic institutions and 
public culture of a democratic society specify a social world within which 
opposing general beliefs and conflicting comprehensive doctrines are 
likely to flourish and may increase in number.  It is unreasonable, then, not 
to recognize the likelihood -- indeed the practical certainty -- of 
irreconcilable reasonable disagreements on matters of the first 
significance.  (Overlapping Consensus, 238) 
 
The above statement highlights, quite clearly, one of the fundamental weaknesses 
in Rawls model: that for some of the most pressing questions in a political 
society, questions that can cause debilitating debates among certain segments of 
the citizenry, there is no path to reconciliation.  These pressing questions are of 
most interest to us insofar that their irreconcilable nature occurs as a result of a 
divergence on religious values.  Rawls admits himself that because we all arise 
from differing backgrounds, which in many cases necessitate certain religious or 
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philosophic leanings, some debate may become overly contentious, where the 
opposing sides are at odds as a product of those differing life experiences.  
Claiming that these debates are irreconcilable does not go to heart of the goal of 
Political Liberalism, and furthermore does not create any path, even in a 
procedural sense, through which individuals who stand at odds with each other 
because of differing religious opinions can come to any kind of an agreement on 
those questions.  
Although Rawls’ political domain is not free from religious 
considerations, it is a society where fundamental political values are separate from 
the religious or philosophic values that may define one’s personal life.  Therefore, 
to Rawls, personal and political are separate under his overlapping consensus.  
Under such a framework, if a debate arises on a basic question where the 
differences on that question are a result of a divergence on religious values, 
Rawls’ model cannot solve these problems because in his political forum these 
values are not debated on.   
 For the purposes of this paper, this is such a pressing concern because of 
the nature of the American political society, which is the object of my theory of 
democracy.  Although in theory the American democracy is totally secular, 
religious currents run deep in our political society.  From the issues about slavery 
and prohibition earlier in our nation’s history to the current issue of the right to 
die as well as the place of religious symbols on government property, there have 
been many instances where the pressing debates in American politics have been at 
the core debates over religious values or interpretation.  Furthermore, the most 
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visible American of all, our President, is a known devout Christian and commonly 
evokes religious rhetoric in his speeches.  In such an environment, the fact that 
there will be irreconcilable questions that arise as a result of differences on 
religion means that the diversity of Americans will become more pronounced as 
those interests come to have a greater stake in the political forum.  What kind of 
theory is it, which has as its goal the reconciliation of a plurality of individuals 
under a political framework, but does not give any answer to the most pressing 
questions that come as a result of that diversity?  It is clear, given this 
shortcoming, that Rawls’ theory does not adequately account for the diversity 
which he claims is the most central characteristic of a nation governed by free and 
democratic institutions. 
 An example of such a pressing issue is the continuing debate over abortion 
rights.  In the landmark 1973 decision Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme 
Court held that this medical procedure, as defined by current science and medical 
technology, should be a right protected under the due process clause of the 
Constitution.  Their justification, which is an argument widely accepted by those 
who believe in a woman’s right to choose, claims that up to certain point in a 
pregnancy, a fetus is not capable of meaningful life outside a mother’s womb, 
therefore making the rights of a fetus secondary to the privacy rights of a mother.  
Using this scientific determination as a backdrop, the debate over abortion rights 
becomes a question of a legal interpretation of the privacy rights of prospective 
mothers.  However, to many, this question is defined solely by religious beliefs 
that claim that one should value life at any form, regardless of the circumstances.  
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Dismissing pragmatic or scientific concerns, those against abortion rely on 
religious doctrine, specifically Christian teachings, to support their position 
against abortion.  When viewing the abortion debate through this interpretive lens, 
the question over its legality turns into a debate over moral or religious values, as 
opposed to debate over privacy rights or scientific evidence about where life 
actually begins.   
 Rawls’ framework, although admitting that differences on religious values 
will occur within a free and democratic society, does not provide a procedural 
answer to how such a debate can be resolved.  Despite the fact that on its face 
abortion is a question that Rawls may deem “simple,” as covered by his “precepts 
of reasonable discussion,” because differences on this questions occur as a result 
of religious values, the debate on this issue has become especially divisive, and 
some cases has turned violent.  Within a society that is supposedly made up of 
individuals who embrace fundamental political values that can govern the free 
institutions of that political domain, it does not follow that these values do not 
provide a guide to the answer of certain questions, especially those that are the 
most pressing for that society.  The issue of abortion, irreconcilable in virtue of a 
lack of an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, does not leave 
room for a deliberative framework where mutual understanding might lead to an 
answer or a compromise.  In his search for artificial stability, Rawls’ political 
conception abandons many of the pressing questions in society, severely limiting 
his ability to describe the real conditions of a political society defined by plurality. 
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Ideology: The Missing Variable in the Overlapping Consensus
2
 
Paralleling Rawls’ weaknesses in describing the real effects of religious 
beliefs on some political debates, his formula for an overlapping consensus is 
severely weakened by the fact that individuals, based on their differing life 
experiences, will interpret political values quite differently.  This occurs, in part, 
because of Rawls’ concentration on comprehensive doctrines, which keeps him 
from sufficiently addressing the various ideologies at play within those doctrines 
as well as the complexities caused by political interpretation within the dynamic 
of his overlapping consensus.  Just as different religious beliefs will change 
interpretations of simple questions and further complicate debate over those 
questions, various ideological interests will cause a divergence on how 
individuals interpret political values
3
.  Thus, Rawls’ ignoring of how ideology 
may influence a fully rational deliberative process not only retards his ability to 
describe rational actors in a political society, but may also put a large burden on 
the feasibility of an overlapping consensus.   
The fact of ideological diversity, as I define it, can in many cases 
transcend religious and other comprehensive boundaries.  For example, it is well 
known that today there are heavily liberal Roman Catholics as well as the 
traditionally conservative ones, and the same holds true for other religious 
doctrines.  Just as differing comprehensive views will flourish under free and 
democratic institutions, so will ideological backgrounds.  Rawls touches on this 
                                                 
2
 Part of this section is a rewritten portion of my paper entitled “Rawls’ Overlapping Consensus: A 
Critical Discussion.” 
3
 Professor Fred Frohock brought this point up in class during a discussion on Rawls and his idea 
of an overlapping consensus. 
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subject briefly when he spells out some of the “burdens of reason.”  He claims 
that “to some unknown extent, our total experience, our whole course of life up to 
now, shapes the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values, 
and our total experiences surely differ”(Overlapping Consensus, 237).  The way 
we see particular moral or political problems, or the “lens” that we see the world 
through based on our prior experiences, are all derivatives of ideology.  Rawls is 
correct to name these a “burden” to the type of reason he wants political actors to 
subscribe to.  Furthermore, it can be an additional constraint on an already 
complicated equation of reaching an overlapping consensus.  Persons coming 
from particular comprehensive backgrounds, those of which can and will in many 
instances shape their outlook on every portion of their life, must justify their 
acceptance of political values without using these doctrines.  Even if we assume 
that people can do this, that they can separate themselves from their religious 
views when wearing a public hat, they may not be able to separate their 
ideological views.  Rawls is explicit in explaining the moral component of an 
overlapping consensus, and that given a real dedication to political principles, 
there can be a political conception of justice that is stable in the right way.  
However, people can have a proportional moral attachment to their ideological 
doctrines, which can cause people to interpret political values very differently.  
Therefore, even given a situation where a person can put aside their 
comprehensive views to embrace political principles, there will be a parallel 
attachment to ideological principles, which can change the interpretation of 
political values.  This can change the stability dynamic that Rawls is looking for 
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because the conception of justice that one person has may be different from 
another, given varying interpretations of fundamental political values.  Explained 
differently, the values being passed on within a society from generation to another 
(the central tenet of Rawls’ “political conception of justice”) may be very 
different given varying ideological backgrounds.   
Conclusion 
Under no circumstances am I claiming that I can explain, in a procedural 
manner, how to solve the pressing issues that Rawls’ model fails to embrace.  
However, uncovering the significant shortcomings of describing a political 
society in a strictly structural manner spells out the need for a different approach 
when trying to amalgamate a plurality of ideological considerations.  In the above 
discussions, two main weaknesses were highlighted, both being related in the 
sense that they bring us to a set conclusion: the real political world cannot be 
explained using assumptions regarding how citizens will define political values 
and debates in the deliberative forum.   
Religious considerations, insofar that they cause pressing debates within a 
political society over simple questions, cannot be solved under Rawls’ model.  
The fact that this is a weakness is no secret; scholars have long maintained that 
Rawls does not provide an answer to solving the problems such debates present to 
a free society.  However, the most important part of this point is that the 
separation of religious and political views is not as clear as Rawls’ model explains 
it.  Specifically, in a real political world where individuals are free to practice any 
religion and worship freely, the line between the political and the ecclesiastical 
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may be skewed enough to disable the requisite separation from religious values 
under an overlapping consensus. 
Furthermore, an overlapping consensus under the fact of ideological 
diversity is not viable considering the differing interpretations individuals will 
have over political values.  These interpretations, as dictated by the definition of 
ideology, are a product of one’s whole life experience.  Therefore, as we move 
into the 21
st
 Century, with a diversity of ideological interests further dominating 
American politics, structural models such as Rawls’ have limited efficacy in 
explaining the dynamics of the free society given a plurality of ideological 
interests.  The answer to this problem is to create a theory of democracy, which 
takes into account the diversity of ideological and religious interests that Rawls’ 
claimed were so central to a free society, yet do it in a way not dependent on strict 
assumptions regarding citizen action in the political forum.  It is especially 
important to note, that a political society is not undemocratic, or ill-liberal, if 
religious considerations are brought into the deliberative forum.  Thus, when 
creating a theory of democracy that will take into account the fact of ideological 
diversity, it is central that the true nature of this fact is taken into account, making 
that theory truly political and capable of forming a path for American democracy 
in the 21
st
 Century.    
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As opposed to spelling out a political framework in the tradition of John 
Rawls with the goal of enabling an idealized political condition, the goal of this 
paper is to create a democratic society of inclusiveness through a new 
interpretation of American democracy.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
structural limitations of a procedural theory of politics does not parallel the fact of 
ideological diversity or the needs of the American polity in the 21
st
 Century.  
Thus our theory of democracy will be born within the parameters set by our 
founders and adjusted by the real political conditions of modern America, which 
were discussed in Chapter 1.  Today, the fundamental weaknesses within our 
political institutions endure as a product of our divisive and racist history, a 
history that we, as citizens, now control.  The goal of this theory is to cure these 
fundamental weaknesses with a fresh vision for American democracy governed 
by modern political realities and guided by our political history. 
Classical Liberalism Reinterpreted by the “4
th
 Modernity”  
 As necessitated by reasonable standards of pragmatism
4
 and the fact of 
ideological diversity, the modern American democracy will be guided by the 
enduring tenets of our founding yet reinterpreted by modern values of political 
inclusion.  Especially relevant to modern democracy will be the standards of 
egalitarianism embraced by our founders.  In the Declaration of Independence, 
Thomas Jefferson writes, in an obvious rewording of John Locke, that “all men 
                                                 
4
 I mention standards of pragmatism because in order to make my theory of politics wholly 
applicable to American politics, I wish to work within the system given to us by our founders, not 
attempt to make a fundamental adjustment to our Constitutional structure with the goal of 
bettering the American democracy.  Therefore, I believe it is practical to apply what I believe 
should be good standards of inclusion and democracy to the classical liberal tenets set forth by 
men such as Jefferson and Madison.  This approach, should in both a practical and theoretic sense, 
enable this theory to have real consequence for those who espouse it.  
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are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable 
rights.”  This statement, a central tenet of our nations founding, is certainly 
consistent with the standards for inclusion necessary to 21
st
 Century politics.  
However, unlike our founders, modern political society cannot view such 
standards as absolute, but instead as a guide by which modern citizens can deal 
with changing historical circumstances.  James Madison viewed the Constitution 
and its supporting philosophy as a “higher law” (Ketcham, 214), yet still was 
explicit in his support for a living Constitution: 
Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind.  As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new 
discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions 
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to 
keep up with the times. (214) 
  
This theory of democracy is certainly supported under these provisions for 
Constitutional evolution, and the “truths” that it will be guided by will be the 
standards of inclusion that are necessitated by the fact of ideological diversity. 
Madison and Jefferson both drew upon the Lockean notion of politics as a 
science, specifically that human society and politics embody certain fundamentals 
– that is natural laws, which Locke claimed were analogous to Newton’s Law of 
Physical Nature (Ketcham, 44).  To Locke, his notion of natural law fully 
described the political domain while Newton’s law similarly described physical 
properties inherent in nature.  As many “4
th 
Modernist”
5
 thinkers have claimed, 
this notion is not applicable to modern society or a diversity of ideological 
interests.  Albeit the “inalienable rights” Jefferson mentions in the Declaration are 
                                                 
5
 Ralph Ketcham, in his comprehensive work on democratic theory entitled The Idea of 
Democracy in the Modern Era, groups together modern thinkers who center their democratic 
thinking on ideas of inclusion as “4
th
 Modernist.” 
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a derivative of Locke’s natural rights formula, we should, as other thinkers have 
maintained, that we can reinterpret the meaning of “inalienable rights” to fit the 
modern era.  As Iris Young, a philosopher who has supported a blanket reversal of 
the natural rights thinking embodied in our Constitution, claims quite 
convincingly, “The existence of (diverse) social groups implies different, though 
not necessarily exclusive, histories, experiences, and perspectives…[and 
therefore] no one can claim to speak in the general interest” (Ketcham, 202).  In 
other words, the fact of ideological diversity, which claims that a diversity of 
ideological interests will have a greater say in the American democracy in the 
coming years, is not consistent with the universality of the Lockean premise of 
natural law.  Instead of there being a set mode by which political actors 
rationalize their ideas, there will be numerous ways depending on ones life 
experience, and therefore a rubric outlining general political principles based on a 
theory of natural law is not applicable to a modern American citizenry.   
Instead, more consistent with the fact of ideological diversity, the 
“inalienable rights” embodied in our founding support the need for absolute 
inclusion in the American democracy.  Therefore, as reinterpreted in a modern 
setting, the precepts of classical liberalism that maintain the existence of natural 
rights needs to be broadened to include the idea that all ideological interests are 
deserving of an equal voice in American politics.  As ideological interests abound 
in the political domain, spreading across the American polity and increasing their 
power in the halls of Congress and other institutions, they will ensure that rights 
specific to their experiences are protected by Constitution so long as their voice is 
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not muffled by the traditions of discrimination inherent in American history.  As 
Ketcham explains, these “4
th
 Modernist” thinkers espouse a political philosophy 
centered on the inclusion of “others” and that democracy is real insofar 
marginalized groups are no longer suppressed by dominant ideologies.  In an 
American democracy centered on the idea of inclusion, the notion of “others” will 
actually be unnecessary because in effect, “others” will not exist in such a polity. 
American Standards for Citizenship  
Democracy, in a broad sense, is enabled by the political action of citizens, 
or the legal members of a state.  Citizenship, therefore, should embody the whole 
of a political society, not a representation limited by dominant ideologies.  
Different ideologies, acting interdependently in a deliberative forum supported by 
ideals of inclusion can allow “cross-cultural understanding, cross-group 
experience, cultural diversity, toleration, [and] openness…become the hallmarks 
of the good society and the essence of justice” (Ketcham, 205).   
As dictated by our founders, the standards for citizenship were set by 
broad standards, which although did enable exclusionary policies in early 
America, were reinterpreted throughout history to allow different groups such as 
young Americans, women, and blacks to become citizens.  During the Continental 
Congress, our founders argued that citizenship rights should be advanced to “men 
with a common interest and attachment to community” (qtd. in Ketcham).  This 
standard, although it has been reinterpreted to enable inclusion, is also seen by 
others as an example of the principled exclusion ingrained in the political thinking 
of our founders and that modern standards have in actuality supplanted this mode 
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of thinking.  Nonetheless, as it has been reinterpreted in the past, standards of 
citizenship must be built upon in the future.  Not only do citizenship rights have to 
be extended to all that deserve them (which today they do), but participation must 
be encouraged and accepted by the broader political society.  Citizenship has 
limited efficacy to marginalized groups if their ideological leanings and policy 
recommendations are brushed aside as not applicable to a broader American 
society.  Therefore, in order to enable a full and inclusive citizenship as required 
by the fact of ideological diversity, a deliberative forum conducive to a diversity 
of opinions will be the deciding factor in enabling full inclusion in American 
politics.   
A Premium on Deliberation 
 In order to enable broad representation and an inclusive definition of 
citizenship, the deliberative forum must be capable of facilitating debate between 
diverse ideologies.  As Thomas Christiano claims, deliberative democracy enables 
equality between political actors (244), and although I do not adopt his normative 
judgment that this equality satisfies some standards of political justice, I do wish 
to build from this idea as it relates to the egalitarian philosophy of our founders.  I 
have mentioned earlier, on more than one occasion, that explicit in the founding 
of the United States was the belief that “all men are created equal.”  Given a 
deliberative forum that enables diverse ideologies a medium for debate and a 
culture inclusive enough to foster such a forum, an absolute equality between 
citizens will emerge.  As Thomas Jefferson claimed, debate and political dispute 
would not be debilitating, but instead a mechanism for arriving at the Aristotelian 
 53 
precepts of the public good and good government.  Even the majority, claimed 
Jefferson, would be measured and reasonable in its control in order to respect 
“liberal precepts” (Ketcham, 51).  Such a political society in a modern context 
would be a sufficient path for the American democracy to follow.  Given an 
inclusive forum, and a forum that spurs debate in such a way that leads to a 
mutual understanding of the fact of ideological diversity will endow America with 
citizens who are able to perform real political participation, not an abstract form 
given by a mere right to vote.  In other words, citizenship rights and the right to 
vote, protected by the Constitution, give differential ideologies modes for 
participation as necessitated by the fact of ideological diversity so long as the 
deliberative forum facilitates that participation. 
 James Madison, writing as Publius in Federalist 10, claimed that a 
diversity of interests in the American polity will not allow one interest to take 
control, given a free and democratic society that extends equal rights to all 
interests.  To him, this dynamic would be effective in proportion to the number of 
interests in America (Ketcham, 44), and therefore, if applied to today’s political 
context, the American government as handed down by our founders would keep 
one group from creating a dominant interest.  However, as our divisive and racist 
history has shown, as well as the current and past battles by marginalized groups 
in American politics (see Chapter 1), certain interests are not given this 
opportunity because mainstream ideologies shut out diverse peoples from their 
attempt at equality in the political forum.  Public deliberation, specifically under a 
deliberative forum open to all groups and founded on standards of inclusion and 
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understanding, will enable the effect described by Madison in Federalist 10 to 
come to fruition in the modern era.  Christiano confirms this in his explicit claim 
that deliberation is necessary for the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and 
goes so far to say that it is undesirable for a modern state to lack the requisite 
amount of deliberation (246). 
Deliberation by American citizens in the political forum will also create a 
medium for consensus making on matters of political debate, whether they be 
routine or pressing.  Unlike Rawls, who as I discussed in Chapter 2 claims that a 
true “political conception of justice” occurs only under an “overlapping 
consensus,” I would like to argue that rational citizens will judge the value of a 
consensus based on the question at hand and the political context of the time.  For 
the more pressing questions, which Rawls’ procedural model is unable to solve, 
flexible standards for a good consensus are necessary to prevent debilitating 
debates and an inclusive deliberative forum allows for a rational decision making 
process on how to judge such a consensus.  Under real political conditions, 
agreements and the nature of them will vary depending on the parties debating 
and the political context.  Although a consensus on fundamental political values 
would make such agreements stable “for the right reasons” (Rawls), this is an 
unrealistic expectation given our governmental structure and real political 
conditions.  Therefore, consensus building under a theory of politics, given the 
fact of ideological diversity, should be given the flexibility necessary under a 
system rich in a plurality of interests. 
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To Christiano, one of the lasting contributions of deliberative democracy 
is its ability to enhance outcomes.  Specifically, he claims that outcomes under a 
political system centered on deliberation will embody particular normative 
standards.  This theory of democracy is not concerned with standards of justice or 
morality per se, but instead is centered on the belief that a fully inclusive political 
process will bring forth results fully democratic.  James Madison, on the other 
hand, following Aristotle, judged a government based on its outcome, not 
necessarily on its structure.  This view, although it does not necessarily take away 
from the democratic standards that America should embody as we move forward, 
does not allow one to justify the premium on inclusion that is necessary under the 
fact of ideological diversity.  Furthermore, imposing meta-standards on the 
outcome of democratic processes would be comparable to placing value on 
certain political ideologies, something that would have undemocratic 
consequences for the United States.   
Concluding Remarks 
   In the end, the path for American democracy in the 21
st
 Century is a 
journey towards an ideal apex of inclusion for marginalized and diverse 
ideologies, those of which are important members of the American polity who 
have historically been set aside by dominant groups.  I hope that as we move 
forward, individuals in power will realize that our democracy is only as inclusive 
as those who partake in the deliberative process, a process that is tantamount to 
ensuring the egalitarian tradition of our founding is preserved in American 
government.  Furthermore, the relative vagueness of this theory has specific 
 56 
design: procedures, meta-narratives, and explicit standards for normative 
judgment are relatively useless in real political settings.  Instead, particular 
premiums for inclusiveness injected into an already standing and proven 
governmental structure will enable a strengthening of the American polity for 
future generations.   
 
 
  
  
 
